Burton and Reitz suggested that Islam should tend to decrease the levels of female labor force participation rate, because "societies that seclude their women by means of purdah or similar customs will have lower rates of female participation in activities outside of the immediate household." Our cross-cultural tests have supported this hypothesis. However, a closer analysis shows that a high correlation is predicted mostly by the "Arab factor," rather than by the precisely Islamic one, as a country's belonging to the Arab world turns out to be a much stronger predictor of very low female labor participation rates than the percentage of Muslims in its population. These relationships hold even after controlling for other factors known to be related to female labor participation. This suggests that the anomalously low level of female labor participation observed in the Near and Middle East might be connected with certain elements of Arab culture that are not directly connected with Islam.
Introduction
Increase in the proportion of women in the labor force has been one of the most remarkable developments operating in the labor market in recent years. There has never before been such a great number of economically active women. The worldwide number of female labor force (employed and unemployed women) in 2003 reached 1.2 billion, compared with one billion in 1993 (International Labour Office, 2013) . Against the background of this process, the level of economic activity of men in many regions of the world has declined. As a result, the gap between sexes in terms of their economic activity has significantly reduced. However, this has not led to fully overcoming gender inequality in any region of the world.
The growth of women's employment has been a strong global factor behind economic growth. This factor may be particularly important for the Arab region where the labor force participation rate 1 is very low in comparison with almost all the other countries. In the Arab world, the total labor force participation rate in 2010 amounted to 49.3%, as compared with, for example, 74% in China, 75% in Iceland, or 78% in Peru (Figure 1 ).
The very low total labor force participation rate in the Arab world appears to account for much of the extremely low female labor force participation-22.7% (as seen in Figure 2 ). This figure is the lowest in the world. Thus, there is a huge growth potential for the Arab countries here.
Islamic Factor?
There are a number of theoretical arguments suggesting why Islam might explain low female labor force participation in the Arab countries. Burton and Reitz (1981) suggested that Islam should tend to decrease the levels of female labor force participation rate, because "societies that seclude their women by means of purdah or similar customs will have lower rates of female participation in activities outside of the immediate household" (pp. 298-300; see also, for example, Korotayev, 2004) . One could add to this that al-Qur'ān contains explicit prescription for husbands to be the principal breadwinners for their families; in fact, the obedience of wives to their husbands is explicitly connected with husbands providing subsistence to their wives (e.g., al-Qur'ān 4:34). Another approach suggests that Islam is associated with gender inequality. For example, Inglehart and Norris (2003) reported that citizens of Muslim societies are significantly less likely to support women's rights and opportunities than those in democratic (Western) countries. They come to the conclusion that Muslim societies still have cultural barriers for democratic development which, in turn, hinder women Haghighat (2005) who put forward an idea that Islam as a cultural variable is not the main factor determining female labor force participation in Islamic countries, as government policies often play a no less significant role determining female employment. On the contrary, Mir-Hosseini (2006) argued that gender equality principles are promoted by Islam and only ultra-conservative regimes are predisposed to inequality. However, a lot of women in Muslim societies are governed and shaped by a set of patriarchal beliefs and laws for which divine roots and mandates are claimed. Only the elite and the minority of highly educated women have the luxury of choice, of rejecting or challenging these beliefs and laws. (Mir-Hosseini, 2006) However, it appears necessary to distinguish between the influence of the "Islamic factor" and the "Arab factor." Indeed, a few researchers have already noted that the female economic participation in the Arab countries is significantly lower than in the other Islamic countries, and, hence, the low female labor force participation rate in the Arab countries can hardly be accounted for by the Islamic factor only. Thus, analyzing the position of Inglehart and Norris (2003) , Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer (2007) promoted an idea that due to important differences within Muslim world, which are first of all connected with religious identity, people living in Arab countries think differently from those in non-Arab Muslim countries. The authors expressed apprehension that democratic processes in Arab countries could bring into power groups which do not recognize individual rights and, in particular, women's rights. Rizzo et al. noted explicitly that Arab countries are significantly less oriented toward gender equality (including labor participation equality) and women's rights than non-Arab Islamic countries, though all those countries share Islamic faith. Similar positions were espoused by different authors (ElSafty, 2005; Santini, 2011) discussing issues related to gender inequality, Islam, and cultural features of Arab and non-Arab countries. For example, ElSafty (2005) explicitly said that there are some features in Arab countries that distinguish them from non-Arab Islamic countries.
Materials and Method
To test the hypotheses specified above, we use the sample including all the countries of the world excluding those for which the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2013) does not include data on the dependent variable (the female labor force participation rate). Thus the sample includes all the countries of the world except Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bermuda, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Serbia, Seychelles, South Sudan, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu; the total size of the sample is 183. In addition to the World Development Indicators database, the Pew Research Center database (Pew Research Center, 2011 ) is used as a source of date on percentage of Muslims in the population of respective countries.
We will first test the original hypothesis using straightforward bivariate correlation analysis. Then, various controls will be introduced through the multivariate regression models.
Tests
Our initial bivariate cross-cultural test has supported the hypothesis that the Islamic societies should have lower levels of female labor force participation rate than non-Islamic ( Figure 3 ). The correlation between percentage of Muslims in total population and female labor force participation rate in respective countries has turned out to be in the predicted direction (i.e., negative), statistically significant (p < .0001), and quite strong (r = −.553).
However, a closer analysis of the data shows that a high correlation is connected mostly with the "Arab factor," rather than by the precisely Islamic one.
Indeed, Figure 4 indicates that the Arab countries form in fact a separate cluster of countries with both a particularly low female labor force participation rate and a generally very high proportion of Muslims in their population.
So could not the correlation between the high percentage of Muslims in total population and low female participation rate be accounted entirely by the "Arab factor?" To determine this, we ran a multiple regression including as independent variables both the percentage of Muslims in total population and a country's belonging to the Arab world (the latter indicator is used as a dichotomized variable with 1 = Arab country; 0 = non-Arab country). The results of this regression are presented in Table 1 .
As we can see, the "Islamic factor" still produces a significant (p = .022) negative effect on the female labor participation rate even after having been controlled for the "Arab factor"; but when this control is introduced, the strength of the "Islamic factor" drops dramatically (with β = −.293), whereas the "Arab factor" turns out to be much stronger (β = −.530).
Note also that Lincove (2008: 45) argued that the relationship between female labor force participation and economic growth is rather complex, although investment in female education "can overcome potential reductions in female participation due to increases in wealth," and therefore, governments could have some benefits for labor markets. Investments in female education in the context of Arab countries seem to be an important factor which could promote higher literacy among women, reduced fertility, and higher life expectancy. Indeed, it has been argued that the female labor force participation rates in the Islamic countries are significantly affected by such demographic variables as total fertility rate and female life expectancy as well as by the proliferation of female education (Haghighat, 2005) . So, could not the low female participation rate in the Arab countries be accounted for by these factors? To test this, the abovementioned factors are added to our multiple regression model.
In fact, the introduction of the demographic control variables into the model does not change the results in any significant way (see Table 2 ). Note, however, that adding all the demographic variables in question to one regression model results in some multicollinearity problems. Indeed, as we can see in Table 3 , three variables-female life expectancy, total fertility rate, and female secondary school enrollment-are below the critical tolerance level of 0.2.
However, this problem is mostly corrected by the exclusion of the variable with the lowest value of the tolerance coefficient (female life expectancy) from the model. The respective regression analysis produces the following results (see Table 3 ).
As we see, the exclusion of the female life expectancy from the model reduces the multicollinearity problems to acceptable levels. As regard the substantive results, one can see that if we add four regressors-total fertility rate as well as female primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollmentthe "Arab factor" still remains the strongest (β = −.492). At the same time, the "Islamic factor" also continues to be statistically significant (p = .026) but much weaker (β = −.267) than the Arab one. The only demographic variable that demonstrates at least some statistical significance is the total fertility rate (β = .344, p = .018). 2 Note, however, that it turns out to be associated with the female labor force participation rate in a counterintuitive (positive) direction, which appears to be an artifact of the "Tropical African" factor resultant from the fact that in all the countries of Tropical Africa, we find very high total fertility rates together with very high female labor force participation rates (see Figure 5 ). 
Discussion
As we see, the correlation between percentage of Muslims in total population and female labor force participation rate in respective countries is in the predicted direction (i.e., negative), statistically significant, and quite strong. However, a closer analysis of the data demonstrates that a high correlation is predicted mostly by the "Arab factor," rather than by the precisely Islamic one. What could account for this? Thinking about the small progress toward gender equality in the Middle East, Ross (2008) in his article "Oil, Islam and Women," argued that the main role is played not by Islam but oil production that reduces the number of women in the labor force, which in turn reduces their political influence. The failure of women to leave the agricultural sector led to less female education, high fertility rates, and less female influence within the family. Taking into account that women predominantly work in trade, mostly in the textile sector, high oil rents reduce the trade sector's ability to compete and force the female workplaces out of business. As female wages are reduced, women prefer to stay at home. Also, high male income diminishes interest in additional income. These factors promote atypically strong patriarchal cultures and political institutions. According to Ross, oil and mineral production helps explain the fact that women in the Middle East are underrepresented in the labor market as well as in the government. Perhaps this factor accounts for a very low labor force in the Arab world. As is well known, this group of countries has a very high percentage of oilexporting nations among them. However, Table 4 indicates that oil rent fails to account for the so-called "Arab factor."
Most oil-exporting Arab countries (Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Libya) have the highest (among the Arab countries) values of female labor participation rate, while those Arab countries that do not have oil rents (Syria, the Palestinian Autonomy, Jordan, Lebanon) are the countries with especially low indicators of female labor participation rate. In fact, for the Arab countries, we find a marginally significant (p = .086) positive relationship between the presence of oil rents and female labor force participation rate, which does not allow us to accept Ross' explanation of the extremely low female labor participation rates found in the Arab world.
The findings we have obtained here strikingly resemble our previous findings on the predictors of the presence of the patrilateral parallel cousin (Father's Brother's Daughter/FBD) marriage among the cultures of the world (Korotayev, 2000) . Our earlier research revealed that though a culture's Islamization turned out to be a rather good predictor of the presence of this form of marriage (Rho = 0.55, p < .0001), there was a much stronger predictor of parallel cousin FBD marriage being prevalent within a certain ethnographic area that predicted the latter almost perfectly (Rho = 0.999, p < .0001). This turned out to be an area's inclusion into the 8th-century Arab-Islamic Khalifate (with remaining in Islamic world afterward). While there is no doubt of a clear functional connection between Islam and FBD marriage, the permission by the Islamic law to marry a FBD does not appear to be sufficient condition to persuade people to actually so marry, even if the marriage brings with it economic advantages, as apparently occurs within most Muslim cultures of sub-Saharan Africa. A systematic acceptance of parallel cousin marriage appeared to take place when Islamization occurred together with Arabization, when conquering Arabs were an ethnic group whose norms and practices were borrowed by Islamisized non-Arab peoples striving to achieve high social status within the sphere of Arab and Islamic dominance. This was precisely the situation within the Arab-Islamic Khalifate in the 7th and 8th centuries (Korotayev, 2000 (Korotayev, , 2006 Korotayev, Klimenko, & Prusakov, 2007) . In this respect it appears interesting to consider a list of countries with an especially low (<30%) female labor participation rate (see Table 5 ).
It can be seen that in addition to the Arab countries, the list contains only those non-Arab countries that were included in the Arab-Islamic Khalifate of the 8th century-Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In this respect, the contrast between Pakistan and Bangladesh is especially striking. Both countries are Islamic. Both are situated in one region-South Asia. The major part of Pakistan was conquered by the Arabs in the 8th century; but no part of Bangladesh has ever been conquered by the Arabs. Female labor participation rate in Pakistan is very low (23%) and very similar to the Arab countries, whereas in Bangladesh it is almost 3 times higher (59.8%). Our previous research indicated that the Islamic countries that were included in the Arab-Islamic Khalifate experienced an especially strong influence of the Arabs and incorporated many elements of the Arab culture that were not necessarily directly connected with Islam (Korotayev, 2000 (Korotayev, , 2006 Korotayev et al., 2007) . This suggests that the anomalously low level of female labor participation observed in the Near and Middle East might be connected with certain elements of the Arab culture that are not directly connected with Islam. We hope that our future research will make it possible to identify those elements.
Conclusion
Let us sum up the main results of this research. The correlation between percentage of Muslims in total population and female labor force participation rate in respective countries is in the predicted direction (that is, negative), statistically significant, and quite strong. However, a closer analysis of the data demonstrates that a high correlation is likely to be predicted mostly by the "Arab factor," rather than by the precisely Islamic one, as a country's belonging to the Arab world looks like a stronger predictor of very low female labor participation rates than the percentage of Muslims in its population (even after introduction of a considerable number of demographic variables). This suggests that the anomalously low level of female labor participation observed in the Near and Middle East might be connected with certain elements of the Arab culture that are not directly connected with Islam.
Notes
1. According to the World Bank (2013), "Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population ages 15 and older that is economically active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period." "Economically active" is defined as "all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It includes both the employed and the unemployed. While national practices vary in the treatment of such groups as the armed forces and seasonal or part-time workers, in general the labor force includes the armed forces, the unemployed, and first-time jobseekers, but excludes homemakers and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the informal sector." 2. Note that when we add in the female life expectancy as the sole demographic variable, it makes no significant contribution.
